Much of the inflation increase in 2021 and 2022 was due to sectoral shocks on which monetary policy has close to no traction. What monetary policy can do, or fail to do, is to ensure that the effects of these shocks dissipate swiftly. We argue that, absent the somewhat delayed but vigorous increases in policy interest rates since 2022, inflation would have subsided more slowly in 2023. Central banks’ most important contribution to inflation is to demonstrate commitment to achieving their targets and ensuring that low inflation remains the norm for price- and wage-setting decisions. This Bulletin evaluates the role of monetary policy in the 2021–23 inflation hump. It first puts the current inflation episode in a historical perspective. It then argues that much of the post-pandemic inflation increase was due to sectoral shocks on which monetary policy has little traction. Some disinflation was likely as these shocks unwound. But we argue that it would have been slower and less complete without vigorous monetary policy tightening. Through counterfactual simulations, we show that, had central banks not increased policy rates, real interest rates would have fallen sharply, stimulating aggregate demand and keeping inflation high.