The Integrated Review Refresh (IR23) describes a more contested and volatile  world which may require greater defence capacity while funds remain tight. 

With a regular Naval Service that is already operating at or close to capacity,  there is little scope to surge. This paper examines whether and how the Maritime  Reserves (MR) can bring extra fighting power at an affordable cost. 

The paper finds that one of the strengths of the MR is the calibre of many of its  personnel. However, they have suffered from a lack of clarity on their purpose  for several years. This has been exacerbated by the decision to stop training  altogether for four months in 2020/21 and then to reduce budgets for training,  including reserve training days, by 30%. Recent moves to restore training budgets  and publish the new ‘Maritime Reserves Orders 2023–24’1  have been welcomed,  as has progress in building and reshaping capabilities, especially in information  warfare.

Nevertheless, fundamental conceptual and structural problems remain; there  is a lack of ambition in the published requirement for reserves across many  parts of the MR. Furthermore, the mission outlined in this year’s orders focuses  on reservists exclusively as augmentees (although there are, in practice, a few  exceptions), something out of line with the UK’s major Five Eyes counterparts. 

It also goes against best practice in comparable areas in its sister services, most  notably for the Royal Marines Reserve (RMR), whose nearest counterparts in  airborne and special forces view collective capability as essential for delivering  operational demands and building unit spirit.