The prospects of research in biological sciences and emerging technologies for beneficial uses in biomedicine, biotechnology and environmental protection go hand in hand with the risk of unintended consequences of the research and its misuse for malicious purposes. While a number of established, discrete risk management approaches exist, there are significant gaps in managing the specific risk of misuse. For example, biological risk (biorisk) assessment procedures are often implemented in biosafety management routines, but these mechanisms do not necessarily cover biosecurity risks, and those that do tend to focus on biological weapons development. Another gap arises from the fact that while biosecurity governance systems such as treaties, regulations, codes of ethics and funding guidelines cover research in the public sector and academia reasonably well, they do not fully cover the private sector; moreover, compliance and enforcement mechanisms vary from state to state and institution to institution. There is also a knowledge gap: many individual scientists and technicians whose first-hand knowledge of their research is essential for assessing and managing the associated biorisks may lack access to biosecurity-related guidance documents or be unfamiliar with the technical concepts and terminology.