Russia’s re-invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has had consequences across the globe, with immediate and ongoing effects for Arctic cooperative governance at both a regional and international level. One key impact has been the suspension of cooperation in the Arctic Council, which Russia is currently chair of (through May 2023) – a move enacted by the other seven Arctic states in the council. Russia’s war on Ukraine has also prompted the formally non-aligned Arctic countries of Sweden and Finland to apply to join NATO, altering the longterm security architecture in the region. Policymakers and analysts alike are reassessing their long-held assumptions regarding the rational/balancing impulses shaping Russia’s foreign and security politics, and in turn the future prospects of rules or trust-based cooperation with Russia.

Other governance and security effects have manifested in comparatively gradual ways. The strengthening of the sanctions regime against Russia has had consequences for the structure and prospects of the country’s economy, including in the Arctic region. The withdrawal of Western companies from Russia has been an important part of this sanctions regime, further reducing a previous point of convergence between Russia’s northern development aims and Western capital and expertise. In European policymaking and political circles, there is now a broadly shared awareness of the necessity of reducing or eliminating dependency on Russian oil and gas products, much of which comes from Russia’s Arctic and northern regions. In other words, several longstanding areas of economic interdependence are being eliminated. Increased securitization and various hybrid threats will also create new risks and limit the scope of science cooperation and people-to-people exchanges, if and when these are resumed.