This book examines whether the mechanisms of accountability characteristic of democratic systems are sufficient to induce the representatives to act in the best interest of the represented. The first part of the volume focuses on the role of elections, distinguishing different ways in which they may cause representation. The second part is devoted to the role of checks and balances, between the government and the parliament as well as between the government and the bureaucracy. The contributors of this volume, all leading scholars in the fields of American and comparative politics and political theory, address questions such as, whether elections induce governments to act in the interest of citizens. Are politicians in democracies accountable to voters in future elections? If so, does accountability induce politicians to represent citizens? Does accountability limit or enhance the scope of action of governments? Are governments that violate campaign mandates representative? Overall, the essays combine theoretical discussions, game-theoretic models, case studies, and statistical analyses, within a shared analytical approach and a standardized terminology. The empirical material is drawn from the well established democracies as well as from new democracies.

本书研究了民主制度所特有的问责机制是否足以促使代表以被代表者的最佳利益行事。本卷的第一部分集中讨论了选举的作用，区分了选举可能导致代表的不同方式。第二部分专门讨论政府与议会之间以及政府与官僚机构之间的制衡作用。本卷的作者都是美国和比较政治以及政治理论领域的知名学者，他们讨论的问题包括：选举是否会促使政府为公民的利益而行动。民主国家的政治家在未来的选举中是否要对选民负责？如果是的话，问责制是否会促使政治家代表公民？问责制是否限制或加强政府的行动范围？违反竞选任务的政府是否具有代表性？总的来说，这些文章结合了理论讨论、博弈论模型、案例研究和统计分析，采用了共同的分析方法和标准化的术语。经验材料来自于成熟的民主国家和新的民主国家。